Political representation as a regulative ideal by Bello Hutt, Donald
Revus
Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija za
ustavno teorijo in ﬁlozoﬁjo prava 
38 | 2019
Revus (2019) 38
Political representation as a regulative ideal
A comment on the democratic objection to constitutional review
Donald Bello Hutt
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/5146
DOI: 10.4000/revus.5146
ISSN: 1855-7112
Publisher
Klub Revus
 
Electronic reference
Donald Bello Hutt, « Political representation as a regulative ideal », Revus [Online], 38 | 2019,
Online since 22 April 2019, connection on 30 December 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
revus/5146  ; DOI : 10.4000/revus.5146 
This text was automatically generated on 30 December 2019.
All rights reserved
Political representation as a
regulative ideal
A comment on the democratic objection to constitutional review
Donald Bello Hutt
 
1 Introduction
1 In his Where our Protection Lies: Separation of Powers and Constitutional Review, Dimitrios
Kyritsis rebuffs sceptical accounts of constitutional review. More precisely, he rejects
what  he  calls  “the  democratic  objection”.  That  is,  the  thesis  that  considers
constitutional  review  illegitimate  because  given  the  nature  of  representative
institutions, endowing judges with the power to strike down legislation fails to respect
a principle of political equality engrained in majoritarian democratic procedures. He
challenges what he takes to be a crucial assumption of this claim, namely the equation
of democratically elected legislatures with the people conceived of as a self-governed
collective. This assumption, claims he, “is false. Despite their indubitable democratic
credentials, legislatures in the legal system with which we are most familiar ought not
to be regarded as expressing the voice of the ‘People’”.1
2 These pages critique Kyritsis’ portrayal of the democratic objection and the support for
constitutional review he derives from its rejection.2 I argue that his discussion of the
concept  of  political  representation  fails  to  account  for  the  role  of  legislatures  and
judiciaries qua participants of a representative political system. Kyritsis neglects that
the trustee and the proxy models of political representation are regulative ideals. Instead,
his rejection of the democratic objection proceeds on the basis that these categories are
rationalisations of political practices.
3 I proceed by first describing Kyritsis’ portrayal of the democratic objection (section 2). I
then criticise such depiction by showing that Kyritsis’ use of the “trustee” and “proxy”
models of political representation mistakenly depicts these categories as instances of
rationalisations of actual political practices, rather than as regulative ideals (section 3).
I then offer some reflections on how my reading of the proxy/trustee divide and its
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elements as regulative ideals count against Kyritsis’ support for judicial constitutional
review (section 4). I first show that even if we accept Kyritsis’ discussion of political
representation,  it  remains  unclear  whether  we  are  in  the  position  to  reject  the
democratic  objection and to  justify  judicial  constitutional  review (subsection 4.1).  I
then argue that my characterisation of political representation as a regulative ideal
warrants  a  more  substantive  conception  of  political  representation  than  the  one
advocated for by Kyritsis.  Such a conception is  inspired by Nadia Urbinati’s  idea of
representation as advocacy. I finish by taking stock of the preceding sections (section
5).
 
2 The democratic objection
[C]onstitutional review sceptics … take issue primarily with the power of judges to
strike down democratically reached decisions, which they find in contravention of
the abstract moral principles enshrined in the constitution. They argue that this
type of judicial oversight is an affront to democracy, however popular it may have
proved in the real world and regardless of its contingent beneficial consequences.
In other words, they claim, we can accept constitutional review only at a substantial
cost to democracy and thus, ceteris paribus, to the legitimacy of the legal order. Let’s
call the sceptics’ argument the democratic objection.3
4 Constitutional review sceptics endorse different forms of this objection. Kyritsis takes
issue with one of them, namely the one advanced by Waldron and Bellamy, who base
their respective versions of the objection on the nature of legislatures and courts. He
attributes both scholars with sharing the idea that “[b]efore we decide whether we
must have judges supervise the legislature, we must first try to understand what is the
point of having legislatures decide anything”.4
5 Waldron argues that in the face of the disagreements characteristic of societies affected
by the circumstances of politics,5 majority-vote incarnates the due consideration and
respect that decision-making procedures ought to have for the individuals affected by
their outcomes. Confronted with the question of which systems of government best
instantiate  such  ideals,  Waldron  champions  systems  of  legislative  supremacy.
Majoritarian procedures of the kind employed in legislatives representative settings
instantiate a moral principle of equal respect that is lost when the final word in the
determination of what counts as constitutional is given to a countermajoritarian body
such as the judiciary.6
6 Bellamy adds a further layer. In his view, judicial review impinges upon the freedom of
individuals  understood  as  non-domination.7 To  the  extent  that  the  terms  and
regulations  of  the  shared  life  of  citizens are  removed  from  majoritarian  decision-
making  bodies  and  entrusted  instead  to  countermajoritarian  institutions,  citizens
suffer  a  loss  in  their  freedom  as  non-domination  inasmuch  as  they  would  find
themselves living under the potential  arbitrary exercise of  the will  of  another,  i.e.,
judges.8
7 Kyritsis challenges what he takes to be a crucial assumption of these claims, “namely
the equation of democratically elected legislatures with the people conceived of as a
self-governed collective”.9 This  assumption,  he  affirms,  is  false;  “legislatures  in  the
legal systems with which we are most familiar ought not to be regarded as expressing
the voice of the ‘People’”.10 For Kyritsis, it thus follows that
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[s]ystems of constitutional review are not morally inferior to systems of legislative
supremacy from the get-go. At least not for the reasons that Waldron and Bellamy
put forward. The political societies with which we are most familiar are confident
to entrust the common good to the independent judgment of public officials, some
elected, some unelected.11
8 Against this, one could insist that even if we bought into the preceding quote, it would
remain true that “judges will rely on their substantive views of the merits of a certain
decision”.  But  Kyritsis’  reply  is  straightforward:  “[O]f  course,  but  so  does  everyone
else”.12
9 Underpinning  Kyritsis’  conclusion  is  a  reliance  on  a  particular  understanding  of
political  representation  and  its  institutional  incarnation,  namely  that  the  fact  that
legislatures “‘represent’ the people in the sense that they speak in their name [does
not] … get us far”.13 Under his perspective, the democratic objection makes sense to the
extent  that  “proxy”  models  of  representation  obtain,  that  they  best  capture  the
substance  and  procedures  of  political  representation.  Instead,  Kyritsis  aims  at
convincing us that “trustee” models “more accurately [reflect] certain fixed points of
the practice of  political  representation as we know it.  In other words,  [that]  [they]
better capture our conception of representation”.14 Legislators are, in his opinion, “best
viewed  as  trustees  of  citizens  rather  than  as  their  proxies”.15 Hence,  there  is  no
substantive difference between legislatures and other decision-making bodies in terms
of  the  equality  of  respect  that  institutions  ought  to  show  for  individuals.  Both
representative and countermajoritarian institutions make much room for judgement
that is independent from the judgement of citizens affected by their decisions.
 
3 Models of political representation as regulative
ideals
10 Kyritsis’ use of the “trustee” and “proxy” models of political representation misses the
fact  that  both  categories  are  regulative  ideals  rather  than  rationalisations  of
institutional practices. The distance between representatives and those they represent
to which Kyritsis refers,16 rests on a misguided understanding of this divide.
11 Kyritsis’  discussion  struggles  with  a  problem  of  conceptual  accuracy  affecting  the
literature on political representation in general, for although the concern is increasing,
17 conceptual analyses of this notion remain significantly underdeveloped. In Rehfeld’s
wording,
[t]here  is  now  a  striking  lack  of  precision  in  the  literature  on  political
representation ... Given the prominence of the idea of representation in democratic
theory  and  its  resurgence  as  a  research  focus  in  political  theory  over  the  last
twenty years, the absence of precision is surprising.18
12 Kyritsis rightly avers that Waldron falls short of providing an adequate discussion of
representation.19 But this is a tu quoque. Unfortunately, Kyritsis’ own understanding of
political representation is also permeated by conceptual inaccuracy. Although he warns
us that he does not intend to capture all aspects of the concept,20 the disclaimer falls
short of justifying why we should buy into his version of political representation at all.
After all, he avows that he introduces the “trustee/proxy” distinction “solely to draw
attention to two different ways of understanding the dependence of representatives on
their constituents”.21
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13 In expressing this caveat, however, Kyritsis is making things too easy on himself. One
must wonder what else the distinction is  for,  if  not  for  providing images that  best
account for our representative institutions and their relationship with those they are
supposed to represent. These are alternative conceptions that – and this is central –
both describe and provide normative guidance to those institutions and to the practices
they engage in; they provide us with evaluative standards. In short, the terms of the
distinction are not, and should not be, rationalisations of what happens in real-life;
they are better accounted for as regulative ideals.
14 Kyritsis,  however,  generally  employs  the  distinction  in  a  way  that  resembles  a
rationalisation of practices of political representation. That is, he takes some salient
features of the operations of legislatures, namely distance and independent judgement,
and then tests  whether they fit  the proxy or trustee models  to conclude that  both
categories recognise that  the  people always have their  wills  replaced by the wills  of
those they elect. Thus, he is led to the conclusion that the “trustee” model is a better
reflection of what happens in representative institutions — it “stresses the existence of
an  element  of  independent  judgement  in  the  institutional  role  of  representatives,
which the ‘proxy’ model downplays”.22 
15 Kyritsis thus suggests that the “trustee” model “more accurately reflects certain fixed
points  of  the  practice  of  political  representation”. “In other  words”,  he  says,  “it  better
captures our conception of political representation”. 23 But the claim that the “trustee”
model better captures our conception of political representation is not tantamount to
saying that it is the best reflection of our practices, and vice versa. The second clause
does not say the same as the first “in other words”. The first clause emphasises the
capacity  or  suitability  of  the  “trustee”  model  to  accommodate  our  descriptions  of
representative  governments  to  what  happens  when  they  operate  in  practice;  The
second emphasises  the capacity of  the model  to  capture our conceptions of  political
representation. The first resembles a rationalisation of the trustee model; the second is
more theoretically normative, closer to a regulative ideal. Through the chapters I focus
on,24 Kyritsis more consistently refers to the trustee model in the first sense.
16 I am certainly not charging Kyritsis with all the vices intrinsic to rationalisations – I am
using the word in a much less theoretically-laden fashion.25 My point is a limited one, to
wit, that we should not account for our models of political representation as if they
were descriptions of our political practices so that we may then derive consequences
for institutional design. We should not, that is, look at our practices, describe them, and
then formulate our political concepts merely on the basis of those descriptions. Qua
political  concept,  this  applies  to  representation as  well.  Rather,  in  building  up our
models, we should rationally reconstruct the practices we have in front of us, according
to their best possible version in normative terms. It would, otherwise, make little sense
to engage in a theoretical exercise of abstraction in the first place – a problem faced by
the political realist claim that the trustee model “more accurately reflects certain fixed
points  of  the  practice  of  political  representation”.26 Political  realism  is  too  a
theorisation of the practices we aim at scrutinising. It is a not an external perspective of
the world, as it were. As Weber taught us, the process of knowledge in our disciplines is
permeated by and necessitated of the subjective perspective of the theorist examining
social phenomena.27 No knowledge is presuppositionless.
17 I here speak of regulative ideals in a Kantian sense, namely as horizons towards which
our  practices  should  be  directed,  even  though  they  “lack  the  conditions  of  their
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objective reality, and nothing is to be found in them but the mere form of thought”.28
This is, in my view, a more charitable way of theorising representation. Practices of
representation should be evaluated against the backdrop of theoretical constructions
not for the sake of merely determining their adequacy to some form of objective reality
or practice. Rather, we better account for the idea of representation when we examine
it against normative categories telling us not only whether what we have in front of us is
an instance of representation, but whether the practice under scrutiny is closer to or
further  from  the  ideal.  In  doing  so,  they  are  performative  –  instead  of  merely
describing, they compel us or invite us to fulfil the ideal. In Kant’s wording, “[e]ven if
one were not to grant objective reality (existence) to these ideals,  yet they are not
therefore to be regarded as chimeras. They provide us, rather, with an indispensable
standard of reason”.29
18 The standard reply available to the political realist is that the chances of achieving the
ideal are scarce.30 But such reply is question begging: the point of a regulative ideal is
that  its  practical  feasibility  is  not  a  fixed  standard  by  which  the  normative
attractiveness  of  our  practices  should  be  measured.  Because  regulative  ideals  are
normative concepts, their feasibility, or lack thereof, does not cancel, but qualifies the
duties, obligations, rights, etc. deriving from it. This is why Kant insisted that realising
the ideal – in our case, of representative institutions – in an example 
is  unfeasible  and has,  moreover,  something preposterous  and not  very  edifying
about  it.  For  in  such an  attempt  the  natural  limits  that  continually  impair  the
completeness in the idea make any illusion impossible, and the good itself that lies
in the idea is thereby made suspect and similar to a mere invention.31
19 Some of the foremost works on the subject attest to the adequacy of accounting for
models of political representation as regulative ideals. This perspective, for example,
underlies  the  way  in  which  Pitkin  initially  discusses  descriptive  models  of
representation,  of  which the proxy model is  a species.  Those who theorise political
representation descriptively are sometimes led “to formulate their ideas in terms of
what a representative legislature should, by its very nature, be like”.32 Likewise, several
authors who Pitkin sees as representative of descriptive theses frame their accounts as
regulative  ideals.  This  is  the  case  with  John  Adams,  who  thought  that  the
representative legislature “should be an exact portrait in miniature, of the people at
large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them”.33 It is also the case with James
Wilson’s contention that “the legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the
whole society … the faithful echo of the voices of the people”.34
20 It  is  unlikely  that  these  authors  were  claiming  that  representative  bodies  factually
reflect the will and preferences of their constituents. And yet, this is the assumption
underpinning  Kyritsis’  attempt  to  diffuse  the  democratic  objection.  Even  those
archetypes of representation that Pitkin calls descriptive are also normative models
attempting to produce political institutions that resemble as much as possible the body
politic  the  system  is  supposed  to  govern.  But  the  roles  we  ascribe  to  political
institutions, whether reflecting the interests, preferences, and wishes of a constituency
or  producing  independent  judgments  á  la  Burke,  are  standards,  not  the  resulting
description of a practice that is already there. The relevant question for distinguishing
between  proxy  and  trustee  models  is  not  so  much  “are  our  representatives  doing
exactly  what  their  citizens  want,  prefer,  or  think?”,  but  “does  our  account  more
accurately reflect the relevant patterns of the practice and its normative desiderata?”
The first  question is  almost  a  non-starter,  for  no one would reasonably  argue that
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proxy models exist somewhere – no legislator or judge is capable of reproducing the
exact portrait of the society in whose governance she is collaborating. Kyritsis is only
superfluously right in this regard when he avows that independent judgement is always
present in any decision-making procedure with delegations of some sort. 
21 The second sort  of  question,  which puts  the  emphasis  not  only  in  practice,  but  in
normative aspects, is more interesting. It compels us to ask whether our institutions
should ideally reflect  as  much  as  possible the  constituency  they  are  mandated  to
represent, or whether their accountability is instead measured by the quality of the
outcomes they reach. This is important: this way of framing the question preserves the
problem  of  distance  as  something  valuable  to  assess  a  system  as  more  or  less
representative. This is, unfortunately, what Kyritsis downplays.
22 This  admittedly  limited  critique  does  not  amount  to  a  full  rejection  of  Kyritsis’
argument in his book – far from it. However, I think it does raise an important question
for  the  purposes  of  solving  the  problem  of  the  legitimacy  of  judicial  review  of
legislation.  The  question  is  this:  to  the  extent  that  the  choice  between  proxy  and
trustee models of political representation does not essentially fall upon determining
how  actual  practices  operate  but  rather  on  how  one  would  warrantedly  want
institutions  to  function  with  regard  to  the  preferences  and  arguments  of  citizens,
which  institutional  arrangement  is  better  suited  to  track  these  preferences  and
arguments not only as a matter of practice, but also as a matter of principle?
 
4 Consequences for the warrantedness of
constitutional review
23 Kyritsis’ rejection of the democratic objection proceeds on the assumption that there is
some  value  in  the  ways  in  which  Waldron  and  Bellamy  talk  of  majority  rule.
Nonetheless, he asks: even if, arguendo, this was the case, “does it make any difference
in the debate concerning the legitimacy of constitutional review?”35 He answers in the
negative. As I have argued in the preceding section, the reason is because of the fact
that Waldron and Bellamy sidestepped an analysis of the concept of representation that
would  prove  that  the  democratic  objection  underestimates  an  inescapable  distance
between  represented  and  representatives.  He  thus  concludes  that  the  views  of
representatives
no less than those of judges, are accorded, to use Waldron’s terminology, ‘superior
voting  weight’.  [Hence]  …  if  we  have  no  problem  in  the  abstract  with  this
arrangement,  we  should  not  have  a  problem  in the  abstract  with  a  system  of
constitutional review of legislation either (not for this reason anyway).36
24 But, as I have suggested, although Kyritis is correct in pointing at the rather superficial
way in which Waldron and Bellamy discuss political representation, he does not fare
any better  in this  regard.  The relative superior  voting weight  that  legislatures  and
judges are accorded within actual institutional arrangements is not per se a reason for
theorising political representation in any specific way – it merely says that this is “the
way things are”, as it were. This failure to see the regulative nature of conceptions of
political  representation  has  negative  consequences  for  the  justifiability  of  judicial
review.
25 In this section I perform a twofold analysis of some of those consequences. The first
part will buy into Kyritsis’ argument and claim that even under his assumptions, it is
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still not clear that there are enough grounds to reject the democratic objection and for
the subsequent justification of constitutional review by judges. The second subsection
argues that understanding political representation as a regulative ideal is conducive to
a more substantive conception of the trustee model than the one endorsed by Kyritsis.
This conception, redolent of Urbinati’s idea of representation as advocacy, takes the
problem  of  distance  as  a  given,  but  interprets  it  in  a  way  that  sees  independent
judgement as a characteristic and desirable feature of representative institutions. Such
a feature is  not  only an observation of  what  happens in reality,  but  a  normatively
desirable trait of the practice of political representation by elected institutions. Yet,
because of this limitation to elected institutions, the argument falls short of justifying
constitutional review by the judiciary.
 
4.1 Constitutional review under Kyritsis’ conception of political
representation
26 I have hitherto been critical of Kyritsis’ portrayal of the trustee model for not noticing
its nature as a regulative ideal. Yet, Kyritsis is right that the leeway in judgement given
to representatives is inescapable. Let us grant, arguendo, that given such inescapability,
the trustee model is the best available conception of political representation, inasmuch
as it reflects the unavoidable distance between citizens and their rulers. Does this count
in favour of judicial review of legislation? No, it does not. The reason is that whereas
the independent judgements, reasonings, and decisions of elected representatives are
to be ascribed to citizens as if these were their own actions, this is not the case with
constitutional judges, whose task is not, or put more charitably, is not best accounted
for, as a representative one.
27 Some  scholars,  however,  have  argued  that  judges  indeed  perform  representative
functions, either by making sure that the representative process works adequately or
by  safeguarding  minority  rights.37 But  this  is  the  wrong  way  to  describe  judicial
functions in these contexts. The tasks of constitutional courts are not best described by
saying that judges are part of a representative procedure. The competences given to
courts by different constitutions in different countries to perform constitutional review
are  framed  in  ways  that  show  that  what  is  expected  from  these  courts  is  the
determination of constitutional meaning, not what the views or the preferences of the
citizenry  are.38 These  constitutions  grant  courts  the  power  to  safeguard  the
constitution,  not  democracy  or  the  representative  system.39 These  procedures  are
countermajoritarian and, thus, hardly representative of the citizens’ views. They could
not be portrayed as such even under a conception of representation limiting the role of
the representatives to stand for the represented. 40 By contrast,  constitutional  courts
stand against the views of the majority.41
28 The  only  conception  of  representation  that  would  give  support  to  an  institutional
setting in which the represented could have their wills replaced by the representative
as  a  matter  of  right/principle,  is  Hobbes’.  Hobbes’  representative  has  a  special
unlimited  right  and  no  special  obligations  “because  someone  else  bears  the
responsibility for his action”.42 But again, such special right can hardly be described as
a  right  to  represent.  As  Pitkin  has  argued,  the  Hobbesian  conception  is  inadequate
because
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[r]epresenting does not mean merely acting with authority from another. There
may be such relationship, but [Hobbes’ examples] are not what representation is
normally  like,  and  they  are  not  what  ‘representation’  means.  Although  Hobbes
defines it  in this way, his own use of the word does not always conform to the
definition.43
29 In a similar vein, some have argued that courts are fit for going “beyond the arguments
[they were] able to collect in [the judicial process] through empathetic imagination of
the potential community of interlocutors”.44 Yet, our knowledge about the social gaps
between court  members  and the  citizens  whose  point  of  view they  are  to  imagine
beyond the arguments brought before them – most often, minorities – does not support
this conclusion. As I have argued elsewhere,45 there is no guarantee, no matter how
heterogeneous the court is in terms of its composition, that its members will be able to
know  the  preferences,  lacks,  needs,  arguments,  etc.,  of  a  community  that  is  more
diverse than the court can ever be. Even if, arguendo, one assumed that this is indeed
the role of a court, there is no correlation between the duty we expect judges to fulfil
and their actual capacity to do so.46
30 Alexy has also pursued a strategy along these lines. He has argued that processes of
representation  are  not  limited  to  those  emerging  from electoral  or  majoritarian
procedures. Instead, he sees representation as a relation between a a repraesentandum 
and a repraesentans  that  can also be exercised via argumentation.  He concedes that
generally, judges “have no direct legitimacy and people have, as a whole, no possibility
of  control  by  denying  them  re-election”.47 Yet,  in  his  view,  the  justification  for  a
representative process also lies in the rationality of the procedures by which correct
rules and principles are identified and applied to individuals.48
31 But again, I do not see why one would call this ‘representation’ at all. Alexy himself
affirms  that  it  is  important  that  constitutional  courts  “not  only  claim  that  [their]
arguments are arguments of the people; a sufficient number of people must, at least in
the long run, accept these arguments for reasons of correctness”.49 Although this ex post
acceptance  by  the citizenry  looks  similar  to  a  notion  of  legitimacy,  it  is  still  not
representation. As it happens, Pitkin applies this reasoning to the case of a judge who
issues an injunction binding on a union. The injunction certainly imputes normative
consequences  to  the union,  and “yet  we do not  say  that  [the  judge]  is  the  union’s
representative or represents it when he does so”.50 Not every ascription of normative
consequences to a third party counts as representation.
32 So,  even  if  one  granted  Kyritsis  that  the  distance  between  representative  and
represented is inescapable and that independent judgement is an ineliminable feature
of the represented/representative relationship, he still needs to answer why these are
tenets that apply to the relationships between citizens and courts. He needs to show
why such a relationship is one of representation.
 
4.2 A normatively desirable distance
33 Kyritsis is right in pointing out that it is a feature of our polities that decisions are
often made in contexts in which decision-makers have ample room for independent
judgement. Among other things, this is what makes trustee models attractive – they are
recognisable in actual practice.
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34 This leads Kyrtisis to reject the democratic objection. But, as I have argued, this is only
one part of the question and, in my view, is not the most interesting one. The other
part of the question goes as follows: is the trustee model normatively attractive? Put
differently, is independent judgement a desirable feature, or is it instead something
ordinary citizens must simply live with?
35 My take is  that  independent  judgement  and the distance between represented and
representative is not only something we cannot do without – it is also a normatively
desirable feature. To explain why this is the case, I will rely on Urbinati’s notion of
representation as advocacy. This way of conceiving of representation, which can be
largely described as a discursive version of the trustee model, is useful in accounting
for political representation as an attractive characteristic of our elected institutions.
Constitutional review of legislation by judges, however, is thus not benefited by this
reading of representation.
36 Representative assemblies are often seen as a “second best”.51 Our basic intuition when
we speak of democratic government is that the ideal is that “the people themselves”,52
not  someone  else  on  their  behalf,  should  adopt  the  decisions  binding  them  as  a
collective.  As  Urbinati  puts  it,  “[i]ndirectness  has  never  enjoyed  much  fortune  in
democratic theory”.53
37 This  way  of  underscoring  the  value  of  direct  participation  over  representative
government is, however, the wrong way of presenting the problem. As recent scholarly
literature  evinces,  representative  practices  foster  a  desirable  discursive  feature  in
democratic  government  which  purely  direct  democracy  tends  to  overshadow.
Directness more easily puts individuals to decide on the basis of their own interests,
not  on the basis  of  other-regarding preferences.54 Contemporary democratic  theory
encourages  a  revision  of  the  idea  of  representation  in  ways  that  allows  us  to
understand that indirectness in politics is not only a necessary evil but, to use Young’s
words, should be understood “as both necessary and desirable”.55
38 One version of these developments, which I want to avoid, is the so-called
constructivist  turn  in  political  representation.  I  lack  the  space  here  to  give  a  full-
fledged  argument  for  my  reluctance.  It  is  enough  to  say  that,  to  the  extent  that
constructivist approaches put a premium on the capacity of representatives to create
and frame the preferences of their constituents,56 they tend to neglect that the latter do
in fact have preferences and ideas which should and could be taken into account. With
this I am not saying that representatives should not have a say in framing preferences;
quite the opposite. What I differ with is the idea that representatives should proceed on
the basis that those interests and preferences warranting the policies they generate
and offer to their represented cannot possibly be known. By contrast, these interests
and preferences are the main framework or material from which policies, laws, and so
forth, are to emerge.
39 In  this  context,  Urbinati’s  notion  of  representation  as  advocacy  is  particularly
illuminating.  She  offers an  explanation  and  a  justification  for  the  compatibility
between representation and deliberative public discourse that sees speech as 
a means of mediation that belongs to all citizens, linking them and separating them
at the same time … It  gives meaning to voting,  which presumes evaluation and
discrimination among articulated opinions… Thus, it is not indirectness per se that
distinguishes representative democracy from direct democracy.57
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40 Rather, what distinguishes these two notions is their lack of simultaneity. Judgement
and  resolution  in  modern  democracies  take  place  at  separate  times,  but  not  in
disconnection to each other. The nature of that linkage is not personal, but discursive.
These means that the fact that there is distance and independent judgment does not
entail a disconnection between represented and representative. In this vein, I subscribe
to Waldron’s interpretation of Urbinati:
[W]hatever its  relevance in other functions of  government,  the abstraction that
representation  involves  is  particularly  appropriate  for  lawmaking,  which  is  a
domain in which we are striving to produce abstract norms, abstracts in the sense
of general, rather than directives focused on some particular person or situation in
the way that a bill  of attainder is focused or in the way that a judicial decision
might be focused, at least in the first instance.58
41 Put  in  Habermasian terms,59 the  relationship  between the  formal  and the  informal
public sphere is better accounted for if one abandons the idea that representation is
just  a  practical  tool  for  dealing  with  scale,  space,  and  time  constraints  and  if  one
understands the concept as an enabler for deliberation and law-making.
42 The question is, then, what sort of framework would be optimal for assessing the type
of conversation that would transmit deliberations taking place in the informal public
sphere  to  democratic  institutions,  in  ways  that  their  deliberations  represent
individuals not only territorially, but discursively as well.
43 I  do  not  have  the  time  and  space  here  to  develop  these  ideas,  which  are  being
increasingly shared by political theorists.60 I shall instead close by asking what the role
of a countermajoritarian non-representative procedure such as judicial review could
have in a deliberative representative scheme such as the one sketched here. I  have
argued elsewhere that deliberation is not a feature we should seek in the judiciary.61
But there is something to be said in favour of constitutional review when courts are not
deemed  as  superior  to  the  legislature  in  the  determination  of  what  counts  as
constitutional or not. It seems to me that courts can have a role in triggering discourse
and  as  “warning  signs”  when  representative  institutions  fail  at  transferring  and
translating popular discourses into the formal public sphere.62 Although limited, there
is then room for constitutional review, but not for the reasons Kyritsis wields. Such
reviewing does not imply that courts ought to be seen as representative institutions.
 
5 Conclusions
44 I have discussed some problem areas in which Where Our Protection Lies, namely those
related with Kyritsis’ understanding of political representation and the rejection of the
democratic objection he derives from such conception.
45 The version of  the  democratic  objection  criticised  by  Kyritsis  rests  on  a  particular
understanding of the nature of legislatures and their roles as representatives. In this
essay  I  have  argued  in  favour  of  the  idea  that  there  is  something  specific  about
democratic institutions that makes them representative in a relevant sense. This is not
the case with courts.
46 From my arguments it follows that the support for constitutional review by unelected
judges cannot derive from rejecting the democratic objection on the basis that because
independent  judgement  is  always  a  feature  of  any  institution,  one  should  have  no
problem  with  accepting  courts  making decisions  on  behalf  of  the  people.  I  have
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suggested instead that the acceptance of the distance and the indirectness between the
people  and  their  representatives  is  a  reason  for  preferring  elected  majoritarian
institutions to the extent that we conceptualise models of political representation as
regulative ideals.  Under these circumstances,  the democratic objection is  correct in
considering  majoritarian  democratic  institutions  as  better  suited  to  perform
representative functions.
47 For  all  these  reasons,  Kyritsis’  contention  that  the  democratic  objection  is  wrong
because the equation of democratic majoritarian institutions with “the people” is false,
does  not  obtain.  To  the  extent  that  one  sees  these  notions  as  more  than  mere
reflections of political practice and conceives of them as regulative ideals, one is led to
the conclusion that the democratic objection does not miss its target.
–Acknowledgment.– This paper has greatly benefited from comments by two anonymous
reviewers.
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NOTES
1. Kyritsis 2017: 82.
2. This  means  that,  although  my  argument  may  have  repercussions  for  different  additional
arguments advanced in Kyritsis’ book, my contentions are limited to the conclusions drawn from
his depiction of the democratic objection, particularly chapters 4 and 6 of Where Our Protection
Lies.
3. Kyritsis 2017: 81.
4. Kyritsis 2017: 82.
5. Waldron 1999: 102.
6. Waldron 2006: 1376 et seq.
7. For definitions of freedom as non-domination, see e.g.  Sydney 1698: 17; Pettit  1997: 51-79;
Pettit 2012: 7-8; Skinner 1998; Larmore 2001: 229-230; Bello Hutt 2018c: 84.
8. Bellamy 2007.
9. Kyritsis 2017: 82.
10. Kyritsis 2017: 82.
11. Kyritsis 2017: 96.
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12. Kyritsis 2017: 97.
13. Kyritsis 2017: 89. I will refer to this in different parts as the “distance” or the “independent
judgment” problem.
14. Kyritsis 2017: 92. Emphasis in the original.
15. Kyritsis 2017: 89.
16. Kyritsis 2017: 89.
17. Consider, for example, Urbinati 2000 and Urbinati 2006; Ankersmith 2002; Rummens 2012;
Rehfeld 2018.
18. Rehfeld 2018: 4.
19. Kyritsis 2017: 89.
20. Kyritsis 2017: 90.
21. Kyritsis 2017: 90. My emphasis.
22. Kyritsis 2017: 91.
23. Kyritsis 2017: 92.
24. See especially Kyritsis 2017: chs. 4 and 6.
25. Epistemologists are not kind in theorising rationalisation. Schwitzgebel & Ellis (2017: 171), for
example, affirm that rationalisations typically result in “epistemically unwarranted degrees of
confidence, if not false belief; it obstructs the critical evaluation of one’s own reasoning; and it
impedes the productive exchange of reasons and ideas among well-meaning interlocutors”. This
is certainly not the case with Kyritsis’ work.
26. Kyritsis 2017: 92.
27. Weber 1949
28. Kant 1996: 560.
29. Kant 1996: 562.
30. I use realist in a Schmittian sense, that is, as unconstrained by norms/rules. Not that Kyritsis
is  a  political  realist  tout  court,  but  his  conception  of  political  representation  (at  least  in  my
reading) smacks of political realism. His methodological commitments, as drawn in his notion of
a Moralized Constitutional Theory (MCT) are certainly not realists, but they are framed in ways
that admit realist interpretations of certain concepts. That is, MTC’s (morally) correct answers to
concrete questions of constitutional law, admit or at least are compatible with realism; in the
case at hand, with how political representation operates in practice.
31. Kant 1996: 562.
32. Pitkin 1967: 60. My emphasis.
33. Adams [1776] 1979. Cited in Pitkin 1967: 60.
34. Wilson [1787]. Cited in Pitkin 1967: 61.
35. Kyritsis 2017: 89.
36. Kyritsis 2017: 89.
37. The foremost example is Ely 1980.
38. Bello Hutt 2018a: 246.
39. See, for  example,  the  constitutions  of  Chile  (Articles 93.1  and  93.4),  France  (Articles  61,
paragraph 1 and 2, and 62 final paragraph), Bolivia (Articles 196 and 202.1), Colombia (Article
241.8 second paragraph).
40. Pitkin 1967: 60-91.
41. As the expression countermajoritarian conveys. Yet, some, like Dahl (1967: 155), have argued,
in the context of the United States, that the “views of the court will never be out of line for very
long with the policy views dominant among … law-making majorities”. Others have insisted that
the legislative and the executive branches share with the judiciary a major role in interpreting
the constitution, and that judicial rulings rest undisturbed for as long as the first two and the
general public do not show opposition to them (Fisher 1988: 244; Kramer 2004: 970). Yet, these
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considerations ignore the real influence of the judiciary in the political process. Although it may
be true that the courts’ decisions are relatively streamlined and statistically aligned with other
institutions,  judges still  have the power to nudge matters  in one direction or  another when
public  opinion  is  uncertain  or  divided.  That  judges  refrain  from doing  this  in  practice  says
nothing about whether the limits that constrain the court and maintain it in alignment with
public opinion are democratically imposed by elected institutions, or if they are the result of the
court’s  self  –  understanding  of  its  institutional  role  and  duty.  In  Kramer’s  wording,  the
determination and definition of where judicial competence ends “is entirely in the court`s own
hands, leaving judges alone to decide where the proper boundary lies between the adjudicated
and the unadjudicated constitution” (2005, 1346).
42. Pitkin 1967: 20.
43. Pitkin 1967: 28.
44. Mendes 2013: 135.
45. Bello Hutt 2018b: 1145.
46. Gargarella 1996:181.
47. Alexy 2005: 579.
48. Alexy 2005: 579. In the same vein, see Rosanvallon 2011: 121-168.
49. Alexy 2005: 580.
50. Pitkin 1967: 52.
51. Waldron 2016: 134.
52. Madison 2006.
53. Urbinati 2000: 758.
54. As  in  the  case  of  economic  and  pluralist  theories  of  democracy.  See  Bello  Hutt  2018a;
Buchanan 1954; Dahl 1967; Downs 1997; Schumpeter 2003: 269-302; Held 2006: ch. 5.
55. Young 1997, 352.
56. Saward 2006: 302.
57. Urbinati 2000: 765.
58. Waldron 2016: 136.
59. Habermas 1996: 305-314.
60. Consider the literature cited by Urbinati in Urbinati 2000: 759. Kateb 1992, Plotke 1997, and
Young  1997.  Also  the  empirical  literature  on  deliberative  democracy  aims  precisely  in  this
direction.  See for example,  Chambers 2003;  Fung 2003;  Delli  Carpini,  Lomax Cook and Jakobs
2004; Boswell, Hendriks and Ercan 2016.
61. Bello Hutt 2018b.
62. I have argued this in Bello Hutt 2017.
ABSTRACTS
This article discusses Dimitrios Kyritsis’ critique of the ‘democratic objection’ to constitutional
review.  Kyritsis  performs  a  misguided  comparison  between  legislatures  and  the  judiciary
regarding their institutional roles qua participants in a representative system. The mistake rests
on his reliance on a conception of the “trustee/proxy” divide that overlooks that both categories
are regulative ideals, not reflections of how political practice operates. Such understanding of
political  representation,  as  well  as  of  the  corresponding  institutional  roles  of  courts  and
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legislatures within a representative system, leads to a refutation of Kyritsis’ argument that the
democratic  objection  falls  short  of  justifying  the  rejection  of  constitutional  review.  After
reconstructing Kyritsis’ discussion of the democratic objection, his arguments are rejected based
on a revision of the notion of political representation. The revision is then shown to directly
affect the argument in favour of constitutional review.
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